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Two ›Cultural Translators‹ of Islamic Law and German East Africa
Abstract

In the existing Islamic legal historiography on the 19th century, the focus has mostly been on the state-sponsored codification projects and the legal reformist attempts of Muslim modernists. In this article, I take a different approach by exploring the trajectory of one Islamic law-book (*Ghāyat al-ikhṭisār*) written in the 12th century and its journey to the 19th century via multiple commentaries and super-commentaries across the terrains of the Shāfi‘īte school of Islamic law. I examine two “cultural translators” of this law book, who hailed from completely distant socio-cultural, political, and geographical contexts: Ibrāhīm al-Bājūrī (1784–1860), the rector of al-Azhar University Cairo from 1847 till his death, and Eduard Sachau (1845–1930), a professor at the University of Berlin starting in 1876. Juxtaposing al-Bājūrī with Sachau, as two cultural translators of one law, I investigate the nuances of mediators who stand between different legal times, traditions, languages, and meanings associate or disassociate with the realities of their particular socio-cultural contexts. Their experiments involving what is familiar and what is foreign explicate that the ambivalences in legal transfers cannot be reduced into any particular moments or intentions of the mediators, and the larger context is emphatically embedded within legalistic projects. Accordingly, the very concept of cultural translation should be reexamined in terms of law in order to accommodate various complexities.
Mahmood Kooria

Two ›Cultural Translators‹ of Islamic Law and German East Africa

The 19th century in global legal history is a time filled with vibrant shifts and unprecedented ruptures, and it is not different for Islamic law. In the existing legal historiography of Islam, however, the focus has always been on state-sponsored codification projects, on the one hand, and legal reformist attempts by Muslim modernists, on the other. In this article, I focus neither on any such political judicial processes nor on any Muslim ›reformists‹. Instead, I explore the trajectory of one Islamic law-book (\textit{Ghāyat al-ikhtīsār}) written in the 12th century and its discursivity in the 19th century via multiple commentaries and super-commentaries across the terrains of the Shāfi‘ī school. I focus on two arguable ›cultural translators‹ of this law book, who hailed from completely distant socio-cultural, political, and geographical contexts: Ibrāhim al-Bājūrī (1784–1860), the rector of al-Azhar University Cairo from 1847 till his death, and Eduard Sachau (1845–1930), a professor at the University of Berlin starting in 1876 and the director of newly established Seminar of Oriental Languages in 1887. Despite the great distances between the lands of Germany and Egypt, as well as the cultures of Islam and Christianity, one law book brought them into close proximity. They also stand in the entangled geopolitics of their time and space, assuming we consider Egypt as being part of East Africa (instead of the more common assertion of it belonging to West Asia or the Middle East).

When many of his contemporaries were calling for a ›reform‹ of Islamic law, al-Bājūrī chose to ›translate‹ the very ›traditional‹ legal text \textit{Ghāyat} by writing a super-commentary on it and explicated how ›reform‹ can be brought into the frameworks of tradition without calling for drastic change. Technically, he did not translate \textit{Ghāyat}, for both the 12th-century original text and its super-commentary are in Arabic. Yet, through a different mode of textual reproduction, he ›translated‹ the old views of the base-text into the new contexts. A few decades later, Sachau chose to rely on al-Bājūrī’s super-commentary when he decided to write an extensive corpus of Islamic law in the late 1890s. Sachau ›translated‹ this super-commentary into German, following a recent trend among his Orientalist contemporaries of translating traditional Islamic legal texts into European languages. His stated intention was making his deep knowledge of the East useful for German colonial entrepreneurship in East Africa. The outcome, \textit{Muhammadischen Recht nach schaftischer Lehre}, is not a mere translation, but it is a comprehensive study of the Shāfi‘ī school of Islamic law. Such a study was unprecedented in German legal historiography.

Juxtaposing the contributions of al-Bājūrī with those of Sachau, as two 19th-century interlocutors of one old law book, I investigate the nuances of ›translators‹ who stand between different legal times, traditions, languages, and meanings that associate or disassociate with the realities of their particular socio-cultural contexts. Their mediatory experiments between what is familiar and what is foreign explicate that the ambivalences in legal transfers cannot be reduced to any particular moments or intentions of the mediators, and the larger context is emphatically embedded within legalistic projects. Through these two paradoxical, yet complimentary cases of ›cultural translation‹, I problematize the appropriateness and applicability of the very concept in the realm of law. As the written texts, codes, or constitutions matter to the majority of global legal cultures, the disinclination of ›cultural translation‹ towards textual cultures should be revisited from a legal-historiographic perspective. I also emphasize that translation is neither merely an act of mediation between two languages, cultures, or legal systems nor an innocent act of mutual exchange. Rather it is an act of multi-faceted appropriations, dominations, and colonization as much as acts of defensiveness and resistance.

al-Bājūrī and his \textit{Hāshiyyat: The Textual longue-durée}

The career and œuvre of Ibrāhim al-Bājūrī provides us a window into the wider nuances of Islamic law in the 19th century. More than the uniqueness of his contributions, it is their resemblance to many other contemporary Muslim ju-
rists, and the many generations before them, that attracts our attention. The copious literature on the so-called Islamic ‘reformists’ and codifiers, who often questioned the very existence of Islamic legal tradition as practiced by the Sunni scholars, has neglected the ways in which larger Sunni intellectuals negotiated their religious and legalistic traditions. The historiography thus focused more so on such ‘reformists’ as Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792), Muḥammad al-Shawāki (1759–1839), Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817–1898), Jamāl al-Dīn Afgānī (1838/9–1897), and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) at the cost of the larger scholarly community of such archetypal scholars as al-Bājūrī. ¹ Very recently, Aaron Spevack explored the internal dynamics of such a normative scholarly model of Sunni Islam: what he calls the archetypal scholar, specifically looking at the contributions of none other than al-Bājūrī.²

In his study, Spevack tells us that Sunni Islam does not fit into a simple categorization, and descriptions like ‘traditionalism’ or ‘orthodoxy’ versus ‘rationalism’ and ‘reformism’ are overly narrow essentialist and reductive theories or description.³ He suggests the term archetypal scholar as a more accurate way of characterizing an intellectual tradition that functioned within a methodological framework combining law, theology, and mysticism. The characteristics of the framework were defined according to two points: one representing total consensus and the other representing the furthest possible bounds of acceptable disagreement that remained within the realm of Sunni Islam. ⁴ Accordingly, al-Bājūrī’s contributions fit into the longer textual and intellectual genealogy of Islam as well as into the contemporary discourses of the 19th century, for he simultaneously engaged with law, theology, and mysticism, along with the trivium-subjects like rhetoric and logic. Spevack writes: ‘He was an authoritative voice in nineteenth-century Sunni Islam, and continues to be to the present day. He did not merely regurgitate the ideas of those who came before him, rather he delved deeply into a multitude of subjects, offered his own views, and applied these ideas to his life.‘⁵ This view is very much in line with Sachau’s own view of al-Bājūrī stated more than a century ago: ‘he corrects many a mistake, gives a sharper form to many a rule, and adds a lot of facts worth knowing, be it from his own or from other sources.’⁶ In Spevack’s study, however, the Ḥāshiyyat that instigated Sachau’s whole interest in him does not find a prominent place. In this article, I explore how this particular text presents and represents a longer textual tradition of Islamic law mediating between different terrains of time and place.

However, before we get too far along, a brief description of al-Bājūrī’s profile and how he became a jurist would be useful.⁷ He was born in 1784 in Bājur (Manūhīyāt Province, Lower Egypt), a town with which he became renowned later. After completing his primary education with his father, at the age of 14 he enrolled at al-Azhar University. One year after his admission, the French invaded Egypt in 1798, and his study was interrupted for a few years. At that time, he left for Giza and returned to the university in 1801. There, he studied various disciplines and texts with many reputed scholars of the time, including ʿAbd Allāh al-Sharqāwī (d. 1812) and Ḥasan al-Quwaysī (d. 1838), both of whom served as the rectors of al-Azhar in 1793–1812 and 1834–1838, respectively. Very early on in his life, al-Bājūrī had been writing commentaries and assisting his instructors with their lessons. Eventually, he was appointed a permanent lecturer at al-Azhar, and he became its rector (Shaykh al-Azhar) in 1847. He held this position until his death in June, 1860.

Certainly, Ḥāshiyyat was not his only text. From 1812 onward he had authored a great number of glosses, commentaries, super-commentaries, and pamphlets on a range of earlier texts in disciplines varying from law, logic, rhetoric, ethics, mysticism,
theology to poetry, and he was truly a prolific writer. Ḥāshiyya is his penultimate work as well as the most renowned among his juridical writings. Although his reputation as the rector of al-Azhar might have contributed to a wider reception of his works, it was not the only factor. Sachau says that their quality (regarding content) alone made them popular. I would add to this that his wider network of students stretching from East Africa to Southeast Asia also played a significant role, as he is known to have spent many hours each day teaching and meeting students. Many of them eventually became very influential professors, writers, intellectuals, and administrators and who catalysed the popularity of his works. In the Islamic educational realm, scholars usually preferred to teach the texts of their teachers for which they had a specific ijāzat (certificate) to teach and transmit.

Among al-Bājūrī’s works, Ḥāshiyya stands out not only because it was one of his last works, thus giving him the chance to reflect upon his earlier works and demonstrated the robust state of his thoughts and arguments, but also due to its particular methodological and analytical approaches, as I shall explain below. Ḥāshiyya literally means super-commentary, and it focuses on Ibn al-Qāsim al-Ghazzī’s commentary on Ghāyat al-ikhtisār of Qāḍī Abū Shujā’ (d. 1197), which is also known as Matt or Mukhtāṣar Abī Shujā’ as well as al-Taqrīb. Al-Bājūrī thus places himself within the longer textual tradition dating back to this 12th-century text via the commentary of al-Ghazzī of the 16th century. In turn, Ghāyat is said to belong to an even older textual genealogy: it is an abridgement of al-Iṣnah of al-Māwardi (d. 1058). Al-Iṣnah itself is said to be a summary of al-Māwardi’s own al-Ḥāfiẓ al-kabīr, which is a commentary on Mukhtāṣar of al-Muzanī (d. 878), which itself is a summary of Kitāb al-Umm of al-Shāfi’i (d. 820), the eponymous founder of the Shāfi’i school of law. But, with regard to the connectivity of al-Ghāyat back to 9th-century al-Umm, we do not see a clear statement in those texts about their textual interconnectedness, unlike its forward connectivity with al-Bājūrī’s super-commentary or al-Ghazzī’s commentary. This explicit acknowledgement of a previous text since the late 12th century is mainly due to the growth of commentarial authority in Islamic legal history as a widely recognized form of juridical authenticity. Ghāyat thus stands as one of the seven prime texts that established independent textual families in the Shāfī’i school.

In a very brief introduction to Ghāyat, Abū Shujā’ says that his colleagues asked him to write a concise text (mukhtāṣar) on Shāfī’i law that would simplify legal studies and ease memorization for beginners. This is a motivation mentioned by many Islamic authors, and it does not tell much about the authorial intention. But the factors behind Ghāyat’s success, compared to other Shāfī’i works, are not immediately obvious. One reason could be its particular time and place in which the leading Shāfī’i intellectual, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), raised an internal attack against law at the end of the 11th century, and his dissatisfaction with the discipline generated a general distrust towards legal studies among scholars. Hence, Shāfī’i, as such, did not produce any remarkable works for almost a century. Out of the context of this intellectual vacuum came Ghāyat – a simplified text encapsulating the school’s law into a simple framework and content, which both students and laypersons alike could make use of. Abū Shujā’ himself was a professor of Shāfī’i law for more than four decades in Basra and was a qāḍī in Isfahan until he retired to Medina towards the end of his life. Apart from Ghāyat, we do not know if he wrote any other books in the field of law or in other disciplines.

Ghāyat was widely used and studied, and the first known commentary came out in the late 13th century: Tuhfat al-ḥabīb by Ibn Daqiq al-Īd (d. 1302). For another century or so we do not find any other commentaries; however, in the 15th and 16th centuries more commentaries came out, two of which are particularly noteworthy: Kifāyat

7 For a chronological list of his books, see Spevack (2014) 22.
8 Sachau (1897).
9 Gran (1999).
10 About the interconnection between al-Ḥāfiẓ and Iṣnah, Ibn al-Jawzi says: «al-Māwardi used to say: ‘A commented on (baṣate) the law in four thousand and I summarized it into forty.’ In this comment (mabnā), he meant kīṭāb al-Ḥāfiẓ, and regarding the summary, he meant the kīṭāb Iṣnah.» Ibn al-Jawzi (1992), 8: 199.
11 For his biography, see al-Surkī (undated) 6: 15; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah (1978) 2: 29–30.
al-akhṣār fi ḥall Ḥaṭṭāyat al-īkhtiṣār written by Taqī al-Din Abū Bakr bin Muhammad al-Ḥusayn al-Dimishqī (d. 1426) and Fath al-qarib al-mujib fi sharḥ al-Taqrīb – also known as al-Qawl al-mukhtār fi sharḥ Ḥaṭṭāyat al-īkhtiṣār – written by Muhammad bin Qāsim al-Ghazzī (1455–1512). Another well-known commentary by Khatīb al-Shārībī entitled al-lqmā ḍī ḥall al-fażāz Matn Abī Shujāʿī also came out in this period, with many more to come. The third commentary, Fath al-qarīb, composed by Muhammad al-Ghazzī went on to become the most renowned commentary among Shāfīʿī jurists: it was taught across the Shāfīʿīite cosmopolis from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Eastern Indian Ocean and attracted more than ten super-commentaries, including Ahmad al-Qalỳūbī (d. 1659), ‘Alī al-Shaḥrāmālī (d. 1676), Ibrāḥīm al-Birmāwī (d. 1894), Nawawī al-Jawī (d. 1898), and most importantly Ibrāḥīm al-Bājrū – one of our central foci.

Muhammad al-Ghazzī, as his name indicates, was born in Gaza (present-day Palestine); however, he migrated to Cairo in 1476, where he built up a very successful career as professor, jurist, and preacher. His Fath al-qarīb attracted the attention of Shāfīʿī jurists because it was a commentary and very precise – two virtues most commentators in the Islamic legal tradition struggled with and failed to amalgamate the both. After the proliferation of commentarial literature in Shāfīʿī circles, by the 13th century, most commentators came up with multi-volume works. Those texts, although useful for finding references and well-received among the highly learned jurists, did not cater to the wider needs of teaching, memorization, and projection of authority at the primary and intermediate levels. On the other hand, Fath al-qarīb was a very precise work (around 300 pages), yet a commentary on one of the most widely circulated texts within the school. This made it a favorite text within Shāfīʿī educational institutions at the introductory or secondary levels, often competing with another text in South and Southeast Asian and East African contexts: Fath al-muʿīn of Zayn al-Dīn al-Malaybārī (d. 1583?). Yet, in Egypt and Syria, Fath al-qarīb remained predominant throughout the centuries.

This receptivity of Fath al-qarīb as a concise commentary of Ḥaṭṭāyat must have motivated al-Bājrū to write a super-commentary on it and select it as the basis for his legalistic engagements according to the contextual requirements of his time and place. By the time of lettering it in the early 1840s, the Salafist arguments against the longer textual intermediation via glosses, commentaries, and super-commentaries had not gained currency in the larger legalistic realm, despite those already being in the air of theology and politics. Thus, al-Bājrū, like many of his contemporaries and predecessors, believed that the best way to advance Islamic legal discourse was to start with its longer textual tradition, even if only to argue against it. In Ḥaṭṭāyat, that is precisely what al-Bājrū endeavored to do: to re-evaluate many previous rulings of Shāfīʿī jurists on a number of issues and to offer new solutions he considered apt for the new contexts and times. Spevack gives one example worth quoting at length:

One of many examples of al-Bājrū’s disagreement with the main text [Ḥaṭṭāyat] and its commentary [Fath al-qarīb] regards the permissibility of eating meat slaughtered by a Jew or a Christian. Al-Ghazzī and Abu Shujāʿī seem to consider the animal slaughtered by any Jew or Christian to be permissible, whereas muʿtamad [the most reliable opinion in the school], which al-Bājrū appears to favor, is that one can only eat from an animal slaughtered by a Jew or Christian who is from a community whose women are marriageable by Muslim men. It also implies the dominant Shāfīʿī doctrine that the only marriageable Jewish women are from communities that are descendants of the followers of Moses before Jesus’s law abrogated Mosaic law, and that the only marriageable Christian women are those who descend from the followers of Jesus before his law was abrogated by Muhammad. Although the opinion stated in the original text and its commentary by al-Ghazzī is the opinion of others (baʿdahuμ), it is contrary to the muʿtamad, which al-Bājrū favors in this instance.13

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13 SPEVACK (2014) 83. His reference to Matn Abī Shujāʿī, 543 is certainly a mistake; the debate can be found in al-Bājrū (1999) 2: 543.
Likewise, oftentimes al-Bājūrī disagrees with many previous jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school, including such varied figures as Yahyā bin Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 1277), who heavily influenced the selection of canonical literature, and the two towering figures among the commentators like Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytami (d. 1566) and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ramlī (d. 1596). The super-commentary by al-Bīrmāwī on Ghīyat is a text that Ḥāshiyat often engages in conversation with many agreements and disagreements, for it was, at that time, the most recent text written on al-Ghazzi’s commentary. But, it also engages with many more of the school’s texts, especially the commentaries and super-commentaries of the most famous text of the Shāfi‘ī school: Minhāj al-tālibīn by Yahyā al-Nawawī. His deviation from the traditional views of the school, as we can see in the case above-cited involving meat slaughtered by Jews and Christians, is part of a larger juridical practice within the archetypal scholars of Sunni Islam. Most of those deviations involving disagreement, which prioritize personal views or weak opinions over the predominant rulings, were rooted in contemporary social, political, cultural, and economic contexts of each jurist – a phenomenon that I have identified elsewhere as a »politics and economy of prioritization«.  

In the preface, however, al-Bājūrī's stated objective is only to address the linguistic complexities of al-Ghazzi’s commentary and al-Bīrmāwī’s super-commentary on Ghīyat. He says that he only intends to simplify these texts in order to facilitate a smoother reading for beginners, and »many people have been pushing me again and again, again and again« to write a simple super-commentary and this is »my response to them.« In practice, he goes beyond the linguistic analyses into rather complicated legal discourses, often bringing together multiple views within the school to prove his corrective arguments or points. Only in the introduction does he stick to language forms, lexicons, and semantics; afterwards, he only uses the linguistic issues as stepping stones to a wider debate in which layered opinions of the Shāfi‘īites from many centuries and across different geographies are amalgamated and hierarchized.

Another important contribution made by al-Bājūrī in this text is his attempt to bring together theological and mystical issues into legal discussions. Within the Shāfi‘ī textual tradition, theology and mysticism are not usually incorporated into law books, although the jurists did write separate works in those areas. The above-mentioned significant Shāfi‘ī jurists like al-Nawawī, al-Ghazzi, Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytami, and al-Ramlī all have exclusive monographs in theology, mysticism, or ethics (and precisely that simultaneous engagement is what characterized a »Sunni archetypal scholar«), but their legal texts mostly stood independent of those areas. In Ḥāshiyat, we see an attempt to combine all three fields into a micro-site – a law book. For example, when we look at his detailed commentary on the word »Allah« as a name for an absolute essence with compulsory presence, we see how he brings in theological discussions. The same goes for many other phrases and names like the Prophet, Muḥammad, etc. This initial combination of three foundational disciplines of Sunni Islam within a single text makes Ḥāshiyat a »proto-archetypal text«.

Such approaches and contributions contained in Ḥāshiyat were well-received by the Shāfi‘īites, as the later history of the text tells us. It was taught, referred, circulated, and used throughout the Shāfi‘ī world. Its approaches were taken up and adapted by the jurists in different ways and forms. To illustrate the point, one of his students at al-Azhar University Muḥammad bin Ibrāhīm Abū Khudayr al-Dimyāṭī wrote Nihāyat al-amal li man raghib fī ṣiḥḥat al-‘aqidat wa al-ʿamal, in which he also clearly combined theology and mysticism into a legal text, making it a proper archetypal text. Similarly, over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, we see many Shāfi‘ī judges, law-givers, and authors constantly cite the text in their legal formulations. Although al-Bājūrī completed the text in 1842, it was first printed in 1856. It must have circulated in manuscript form until then, as the printing press had not yet been popularized in

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14 Kooria (2016).
16 al-Dimyāṭī (1895); MSS, Umm al-Qura University; cf. Kooria (2016) 238–239.
the Islamic world for printing religious and legal texts. After the death of al-Bājūrī, however, multiple editions of the text were printed in 1868, 1881, and 1886 (two editions), 1908, and 1924 by different publishing companies, and since then many more groups have been reprinting the old editions. It still continues to be printed in several countries across the Shāfiʿīte world. All these components demonstrate the wider receptivity that the book received among the students and practitioners of Shāfiʿī law.

Now the question is, how does al-Bājūrī’s whole legalistic engagement in Ḥāshiyat, which connects his own context and concerns in the 19th century to those of the 16th and 12th centuries, contribute to our discussion concerning an arguable cultural transition of law? In other words, to what extent can his juridical accomplishments with the multi-layered texts be interpreted as «translation,» if it is at all a suitable framework to analyze the broader trends among the archetypal scholars of the Islamic world? Before addressing these questions, let me juxtapose al-Bājūrī with an «actual» translator of Islamic law – namely, Eduard Sachau.

Sachau: East Africa and Mubammedanisches Recht

Ḥāshiyat caught the attention of European scholars after the text was selectively translated from Arabic into German by Eduard Sachau in the late 19th century. The European scholarly investigations into Islamic law (in particular) and the Islamic world (in general) had begun to intensify starting in the mid-19th century and involved a variety of political, scholarly, colonial, and administrative motivations and interests. Many Shāfiʿīte texts were thus translated into a substantial number of European languages and analyzed within these discourses, and Ḥāshiyat and its commentary of al-Ghazzi also had immediately attracted the attention of Orientalists. Sachau’s work was a continuation of his European predecessors, who worked on Ḥāṣiyat and al-Ghazzi’s commentary.

Ḥāṣiyat was translated into Dutch in 1859 by Solomon Keyzer under the title Précis de jurisprudence musulmane selon le rite châfeite. Keyzer undertook this project as part of his larger engagement with Islamic law. He was one of the earliest Dutch academics to deal with Islamic law in order to teach it to aspiring colonial administrators heading to the Dutch East Indies. At the Colonial Institute in Delft, Keyzer succeeded the Arabist Albert Meursinge (1812–1850), who had dealt with the Malay law book of ʿAbd al-Raʿūf Sinkili (d. 1693) Mir ʿāt al-ṣūllāh ʿī tasbī ʿal-ʾashkām al-sharʿīyyat ʿī Malik al-wabḥāb, which was composed at the request of Acehnese female ruler Tāj al-Salātīn. This work was a textbook in Delft. As his successor, Keyzer attempted to revive Meursinge’s scholarship by performing a close reading of the Islamic legal texts in order to better understand the Muslim legal cultures in the Dutch colonies. Thus, he came out with multiple works related to Islamic law, and most of those were direct translations, abridgements, or critical editions of Arabic, Javanese, or Malay texts. Before translating Ḥāṣiyat, he published in 1853 Kitāb Toehpaḥ: Javaansch-Mohammedaansch wetboek, arguably based on a Javanese-Islamic law book. In the same year, he also published an introduction to Islamic law, which was the first of its kind in Dutch. In 1857, he brought out a work on Islamic criminal law entitled Het Mohamadsche strafrecht naar Arabische, Javaansche, en Maleische rechtbronnen. After the publication of Ḥāṣiyat’s translation, he also worked on the administrative and public laws of Islam and used al-Māwardi’s renowned »mirror for princes« as the basis for this work. He published this in 1862 as Mawerdī’s.

17 The first indigenous printing press in Egypt was established only in 1822 at Bulaq, and it was mostly used for government purposes, like publishing on military and naval topics. Out of 243 titles published by the Bulaq Press, the majority of books were on military and naval subjects (48 titles), followed by poetry (26), grammar (21), mathematics and mechanics (16), medicine (15), and veterinary medicine (12). Lunde (1981) 33.
19 Keyzer (1859).
20 Meursinge (1844).
22 Keyzer (1853a).
23 Keyzer (1853b).

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public en administrative regt van den Islam. Against this background of scholarly pursuits, his selection and translation of Ghāybat makes perfect sense. Throughout his career, he sought to find a ‘pure Islam’ explained in the Middle-Eastern legal texts he dealt with. With a basic understanding of the fact that the Muslims in the archipelago follow Shāfi’ī ism, he took up the prominent texts of that school, translated them either from Arabic, Malay, or Javanese into Dutch, and published and/or taught them to his students. Ghāybat was clearly the most important Shāfi’ī text that he had translated – most of his other works dealt only with particular aspects of Islamic law.

More than two decades later, another Dutch scholar L.W.C. van den Berg continued Keyzer’s quest to uncover Islamic legal aspects of the colonies, and he stressed that the focus should be on the texts used by Muslims. He argued that Ghāybat was less influential in the Dutch East Indies and suggested that Minhâdj at-talibîn of Yalhyâ al-Nawawi is actually the most famous text among Shāfi’ī ites. He translated that text into French in the 1880s as Minhâdj at-talibîn; Le guide des zélés croyants: Manuel de jurisprudence Musulmane selon le rite de Chaâfi’. This was during his career in the East Indies as »Official for the practice of ›Indische‹ languages and Advisor for ›Oostersche‹ (›Eastern‹) languages and Muslim law« a position that he had held from 1878 till 1887. He then, he came back to the Netherlands and was appointed professor at the University of Delft, where he continued to contribute to the scholarship on Islamic law by writing a number of books, articles, and reviews and earning many friends and foes (especially Christian Snouck Hurgronje, who frequently criticized him). During this tenure, he ventured to translate al-Ghazzi’s commentary on Ghāybat into French in 1894. In the preface to this book, he did not hesitate to spell out the outright colonial motivation behind his interest in Islamic law and the translation of al-Ghazzi’s commentary. He wrote:

From year to year European control over Moslem peoples is extending, so that it is unnecessary to insist upon the importance of rendering the two works that form the basis of the legal literature of the Shāfi’ī school accessible, not only to a small number of Arabic scholars, but also to magistrates and political agents to whom that language continue for the most part unfamililar.27

Fath al-qarib of al-Ghazzī thus catered to the colonial scholarly pursuit, while the other work he mentions is Minhâj al-talibîn, which was a text that he had already translated. After all, his translations of the texts were funded by the colonial government, as he himself writes: »In the Netherlands there is a special interest as the great majority of Muslims among its subjects follow the Shāfi’ī school. That is why Government has decided to appoint me« to undertake this project. Both of these translations are in need of extensive study, not only in terms of their authorial intention and colonial motivation, but also their content, methods, and approaches. For the moment, suffice it to say that he also has utilized al-Bajûrî’s super-commentary on many occasions while translating Fath al-qarib either to cross-check the variations in the original Arabic or to provide annotations. As in Minhâj, here, too, he provides the original Arabic on the facing pages with indications as to the differences in several manuscripts. Unlike the original, the translation is divided into sections and articles intended to facilitate comprehension of the text.

This entanglement of colonial expansion and translation of Islamic legal texts is what is reflected in German East-African history, and that is what makes Eduard Sachau and his law book part of a longer and broader project within Islamic legal history. Similar to their British and Dutch »colleagues« falling somewhere along the colonial spectrum, German colonizers in East Africa also considered mastery of the Islamic legal texts to be the best way to handle the juridical problems concerning their large number Sunni Shāfi’ī subjects. Once the protectrices of the German East African Company expanded from Tanganyika to Bagamoyo, Dar es-Salam, Kilwa, etc. and their further advancements met with serious resistance in the 1880s and 1890s, such as the Abushiri Revolt in 1888–1889 by the Arab and Swahili subjects and
the Hehe tribal insurrection under the leadership of Chief Mkawawa between 1891 and 1898, the administrators sought different ways to subjugate its population. Along with many other resolutions, some officers realized the importance of law and endeavored to codify the «indigenous» legal practices by translating and annotating related texts. That is how Sachau indirectly ends up translating the Ḥāshīyat of al-Bājrū as Muhammedanisches Recht nach schafīitischer Lehre in 1897. In the book’s preface, he states the relevance of the text in smoothing the German administration’s tasks in East African Muslim areas.29

He had already published works in German on Islamic law and, given his numerous publications and translations, including Muhammad bin Ahmad Birüni’s magnum opus on al-Hind, had been acclaimed as one of the first authorities in German academia on Islam and Islamic history. After concluding his studies in Kiel, Leipzig, and Halle, as well as obtaining his doctoral degree at Halle in 1867, he was appointed professor at the universities of Vienna and Berlin, respectively. He had a profound mastery of many Semitic languages, including Arabic, Persian, Syriac, and Aramaic; and this played no small part in his appointment as director in 1887 of the newly created Seminar of Oriental Languages at the University of Berlin. Nearly 30 years before Muhammedanisches Recht came out, he had published a study on the early history of Islamic law, in which he presented a general picture of the foundations and formative differences of legal schools.30 Though his source-analyses and many arguments were analogous to the traditional Muslim narratives, this study was, nonetheless, something innovative in German academia, which was just starting to engage with the Islamic legal historiography. He had also worked on the Ḥāṣdī version of Islamic law, focusing on inheritance law after having conducted field-research in East Africa in order to understand the binding legal systems there.31 In the empirical research among the fuqahā of Zanzibar, he utilized questionnaires (to which only one Ḥāṣdī scholar responded) and interviews (in which many Shāfiʿite jurists responded).32 Furthermore, he also worked extensively on a number of other such legal traditions as those of the Syrian Nestorian Christians, Sassanids, etc.33

Against the backdrop of his own engagements with Islamic law, Sachau undertook the project of translating the Ḥāshīyat and did so in a way that perfectly fit two trends of his time: the general trend in Western Europe of translating Islamic legal texts as a means to facilitate colonial administrations, and the particular trend initiated by Keyzer of translating the works from Ghāyat textual family of the Shāfī school. With regard to the former, the preface of Muhammedanisches Recht opens by articulating both how the colonial expansions have brought so many Muslim lands under the aegis of Christian empires and rulers – as can be seen in British India, Dutch Indies, Algeria, and Russia, not to mention in German East Africa – and just how important law has become when it comes to controlling the new subjects. He also enlists the earlier attempts by the Europeans to deal with Islamic law, such as those of Warren Hastings, Charles Hamilton, and William Jones in 18th-century British India to translate Islamic legal texts or to formulate new legal codes that merge colonial projects with Islamic legal traditions.34 Through these descriptions, he asserts his own position in that longer chain of scholarship that facilitated the taming of the Muslim subjects. In addition, he also tells us his own trajectory in dealing with Islamic law over the course of the three decades spanning his first article on this subject and the present work. He says that while back then Germany hardly possessed any Muslim lands, the current situation has changed entirely and a better grasp of Islamic law now has a broader appeal.35

With regard to the second trend, the wider receptivity of Ḥāshīyat in the Shāfiʿite world mentioned above must have served as an initial introduction for him. Concerning the work and its receptivity among the Shāfiʿites, he writes: «It is among the great and latest commentaries of Shāfiʿite Islam. It enjoys the largest authority not

29 Sachau (1897).
30 Sachau (1878) 699–723.
31 Sachau (1894).
32 Sachau (1898) 1–8.
33 For a list of his works until 1914, see Weil (1915) 1–14.
34 Sachau (1897) vii–ix.
35 Sachau (1897) xvi.
only in the University in Cairo and in Egypt, but also in other parts such as in East Africa.\textsuperscript{36} He also firmly believed in its internal strength as an outstanding text of Shāfi`īe law, especially when compared to the overly precise texts such as the Minhāj or the complicated commentaries. As quoted above, he writes about al-Bājūrī’s legal approach: »he corrects many a mistake, gives a sharper form to many a rule, and adds a lot of facts worth knowing, be it from his own or from other sources.«

In \textit{Muhammedanisches Recht}, Sachau does not translate Ḥāshiyyat word for word. Rather he utilizes it to produce a codified form of Islamic law. Whereas al-Bājūrī followed a traditional method of writing a super-commentary (i.e. by breaking up each sentence or phrase into its components to analyze the linguistic, theological, scriptural, or and historical values embedded in the legalistic articulations), Sachau pays more attention to the content and rulings. To this end, he subdivides each chapter into numbered »articles« that «communicate» with the reader in the form and language of European codes, yet without altering the original content. Many foreign terms and phrases are annotated in the endnotes of each chapter. More interestingly, he skips over or summarizes many parts of the Ḥāshiyyat related to criminal laws or public laws, for he considered them too cruel or too controversial for the likes of the German administration.\textsuperscript{37} However, Ḥāshiyyat was not his only reference. He also makes use of other known commentaries and super-commentaries within and beyond the Ghayāyat textual family: primarily using the commentary written by al-Khatīb and the super-commentary by al-Birmāwī. When it came to additions and deletions, in many ways he followed the approach used by Van den Berg when translating Minhāj in the 1880s. A comparative analysis of both translations and the possible affiliations between both translators might reveal more interesting aspects.

Once the book came out, the Dutch scholar C. Snouck Hurgronje criticized Sachau’s selection of the Ḥāshiyyat, and suggested that he should have instead translated al-Sharwānī’s Ḥāshiyyat on Ṭubṭat of Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytamī, which was the well-known and most relied upon text among the Shāfi`īeites of the time.\textsuperscript{38} I believe that Hurgronje’s suggestion stems from an improper generalization he tended to make connected with his educational experiences in Mecca. Given that al-Sharwānī was a teacher of Shāfi`īe law in the city for quite a long time, it comes as no surprise that he was certainly well-known in Mecca and in the regions closely associated with it. In contrast, al-Bājūrī’s Ḥāshiyyat must have been more widely circulated among the Swahili Shāfi`īeites (as Sachau himself attests in the preface of the book) than al-Sharwānī’s work on Ṭubṭat. Hurgronje seems to have overlooked this regional difference, for he makes this blanket generalization based on his knowledge of Shāfi`īe texts used in Mecca and in the Malay world.

Apart from Hurgronje’s criticisms, the work was well-received in the German and English clusters of Islamic law. It was used by the German lawyers and administrators in the region when they were involved in legal issues pertaining to Muslims/Islam. The English in East Africa also must have made use of the work, as one reviewer anticipated: »It will even prove very useful to English jurisconsults in Eastern Africa, because the Shi‘ite rite is there the ruling one.« \textsuperscript{39} The same reviewer also thought that the book offered grand arguments to those who campaign for the establishment of an Oriental School in London (which eventually materialized as the School of Oriental and African Studies). Indeed, many Islamic legal texts were used by the German and English judges in East African courts for several years, but specific usage of this text still needs to be explored.\textsuperscript{40}

Since I have already presented the legalistic entanglements of both al-Bājūrī and Sachau, now

\textsuperscript{36} Sachau (1897) xxv.
\textsuperscript{37} Among the Islamist scholars of the time, there was a general consensus that the Islamic criminal law was too cruel and inapplicable. In his translation of Minhāj, Van den Berg also mentions this in the opening pages.
\textsuperscript{38} Hurgronje (1898).
\textsuperscript{39} Hirschfeld (1898) 433.
\textsuperscript{40} Stockreiter (2010) 569–570; Stockreiter (2015) 30, 56, 100.
let us return to the question I raised about the appropriateness of identifying al-Bājūrī’s contributions as «cultural translations of law.» Indeed, if the same question can also be raised about Sachau’s work, then a juxtaposition of their contributions would be rather revealing of this concept as a meaningful framework for analysing the legal interactions between various regions, periods, cultures, and societies.

Scholarly Communitas Along the Thresholds

In the existing theories of cultural translation, the primary concern involves the circulation of people as well as consequent cultural encounters and exchanges more so than the movement of objects like texts. Taken in this sense, al-Bājūrī and Sachau’s texts do not seem appealing to such articulations based on the mobility of people. But their works do matter very much in the cultural translation, for those did, indeed, intermediate between distant times, spaces, cultures, and systems of law. If the traditional framework of translation studies focuses on the processes taking place between a «start text» and a «fixed target text», then cultural translation conceptualizes the intermediating «translator» as someone who negotiates between two or more different cultures formulating a cultural hybridity that mediates with or against the problematic cultural borders. Such borders generated semiotic entities as an in-between zone of ambivalence and ambiguity, which are often identified as thresholds. Victor Turner theorized the status of thresholds (limen or margin), which remain crucial in a meaningful translation between cultures.41 Engaging with the Belgian folklorist Arnold van Gennep and analyzing the rites de passage, he substantiated the liminality as a stage of transformation in which a new sense of communitas comes into being.42 Communitas emerges from a non-social structural context in the three phases of rites of passage: separation, margin, and aggregation. While the first and last phases are self-explanatory, the margin is the core of liminality in which a person finds a new «community» (a term with which Turner disagrees) after departing from his/her fixed points in a social structure, yet prior to re-aggregating. Such a formulation of communitas is a «social anti-structure» in opposition to the «social structure» that has its own fixed rules, statuses, regulations. Communitas is thus «a relationship between concrete, historical, idiosyncratic individuals» who share an undifferentiated, unmediated sense of community. Accordingly, al-Bājūrī and Sachau’s contributions can be understood against the liminality of an ideological communitas of archetypal scholars or Orientalists, for their specific belonging to such a communitas has developed «a structure in which free relationships between individuals had [sic] converted into norm-governed relationships between social personae» and both the archetypal scholars and Orientalists have been scholarly collectives that arose in a historical spontaneity with or against the normative scholarly practices interconnecting distant times and places.

The cultural theorist Homi Bhabha problematizes the cultural translation process in his close reading of literary texts against the backgrounds of post-colonial historical structures and migrations. He argues that the «newness» that a diasporic or minority community comes across owes to medias res: «a newness that is not part of the ›progressivist‹ division between past and present, or archaic and the modern; nor is it a ›newness‹ that can be contained in the mimesis of ›original and copy‹».43 The borderline between adapting the newness or resisting it is thus formulates the state of cultural hybridity and the process of cultural translation. In his own words, «cultural translation desacralizes the transparent assumptions of cultural supremacy, and in that very act demands a contextual specificity, a historical differentiation within minority or diasporic positions».44 His conceptualizations owe to Walter Benjamin’s notion of «untranslatability» and Derrida’s commentary on it, but those are irrelevant for the present analysis.45 Moreover, most of his theories (in particular) and the cultural-translational theory (in general) have been used to address the post-colonial situations of previous colonies and metropoles as well as the mobility of

41 Turner has explained this concept in his various writings. The citations in this article are mainly from Turner (1969) 91–165; Turner (1974) 47; 231.
42 Van Gennep (1960).
44 Bhabha (1994) 228
45 Benjamin (1968); Derrida (1985).
people between different places and cultures. For these reasons, these frameworks have largely been addressed to and utilized by the social scientific disciplines and, to a lesser extent, by the humanities. Although the historical developments of the 19th century set the background for such exercises, the historians as such have been largely reluctant to adapt them. These precautions should be kept in mind when reflecting on al-Bâjjîrî’s Ḥâshiyat and Sachau’s Muhammedanisches Recht through the prisms of cultural translation of law.

Despite his adherence to a long existing juridical genealogy and presence in an archaic space of legal transmissions, he adjoins to the cultural-translation framework, for he constructed a newness through his translation of the centuries-old textual longue-durée into the contexts of the 19th century. In doing so, he resisted another kind of newness that was taking shape around him: the codification and so-called reformation of Islamic law. If the modernist ideas that would come to dominate the Egyptian intellectual scenario as well as the wider Muslim world in the following decades were cast as progressive ways to reform and reformulate Islamic law, al-Bâjjîrî and his Ḥâshiyat firmly believed in the potential of earlier texts and sought ways to advance their normativity by making it appealing to his time and place. His legalistic rationale might not have catered to the progressive mental scope of the later majoritarian intellectuals, but it certainly did satisfy the communitas of archetypal scholars, who continued to resist the reformist impulses against the rich legal tradition.

Such newness in his critical engagement with the standing tradition within the frameworks of a longer textual and scholarly genealogy thus catalyzed the receptivity of his thoughts across the legal cosmopolis of Shâfi‘ism from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Sachau’s translation itself is a very telling exemplification in its reachability.

Sachau’s work, however, comes across very differently if we read it through the prism of cultural translations of law. Although he did translate Ḥâshiyat – thus it can be analyzed as such – his intermediation between two dissimilar legal cultures is what is more relevant to the matter at hand. His primary motivation was to make the text useful for the increasing colonial expansion, and his translation stood as the most appropriate object towards that end. In contrast to the earlier European scholarship that mostly ignored the Islamic texts or used them only to engage in polemical discourses, the scholarship in the 19th century created or found themselves in an in-between zone of powerful scholarly-political ambivalence. Their liminality nurtured a communitas, which was eventually referred to as Orientalists. They were caught or entangled between their contemporary scholars, who pursued knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and colonial officers, who pursued knowledge for a better administration of colonized lands and people. Muhammedanisches Recht is thus a product of its liminality as a tool of administration, yet also a work of scholarship unprecedented in the German academia.

Through these frameworks, if both the texts Ḥâshiyat and Muhammedanisches Recht and their respective authors, al-Bâjjîrî and Sachau, can be analyzed as an explication of cultural-translation in terms of law, an immediate problem arises: that of textuality. According to the cultural translation theory, there should not be start texts and target texts. But in our case, there are: both Ghâyat and its commentary to Ḥâshiyat as well as Ḥâshiyat for Muhammedanisches Recht. In most analyses of legal history, especially once we look into the theoretical and jurisprudential transmissions, the case would not be much different. If this situation does not impede the analytical possibility of cultural translation in legal historiography, we have to bring back texts and textuality into cultural translational theory. Or, we have to populate the texts: the texts are people, whether or not the authors are still alive. Unless and until the legal historiographical research solves this predicament, the cultural translation of law would bestow a conceptual oxymoron.

Conclusion

Through the two paradoxical, yet complimentary cases of cultural translation explicit in al-Bâjjîrî’s Ḥâshiyat and Sachau’s Muhammedanisches Recht, translation is not merely an act of mediation between two different legal systems, and it is not an innocent act of mutual exchange. Rather it is an act of resistance, reformulation, appropriation, domination, and colonization. By writing a super-commentary and bringing new perspectives to the old texts, al-Bâjjîrî asserted new meanings to an otherwise dead text. This act of bestowing new meanings was an archetypal scholarly way of negotiating with the notions of reform standing within the
frameworks of a long normative textual order. Bringing new meanings and perspectives to a 12th-century legal text and its 16th-century commentary, al-Bāji’ūrī and his Ḥāsibjāt resisted unacceptable forms of deviations (bid‘at) from Islamic law. This translation of a normative legal culture into the new space and time appealed to a wider communitas of archetypal scholars who also wanted to defend their commentarial authority against the ‘reformist calls for a complete elimination of such a textual longue durée. If al-Bāji’ūrī’s translation was simultaneously a defensive and constructive act, Sachau’s translation was a tool for economic exploitation, political subjugation, and cultural appropriation. Both their cases thus tell us that the translation is not an innocent act of cultural mediation and production, rather it is very much ideological, political, and often oppressive and destructive. They also demonstrate that the texts stand at their legalistic projects of cultural translation.

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